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Chapter 1
An Analysis of Anonymity in the
Bitcoin System
Fergal Reid and Martin Harrigan
Abstract
Anonymity in Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer electronic currency system, is a com-
plicated issue. Within the system, users are identified by public-keys only. An
attacker wishing to de-anonymize its users will attempt to construct the one-
to-many mapping between users and public-keys and associate information
external to the system with the users. Bitcoin tries to prevent this attack by
storing the mapping of a user to his or her public-keys on that user’s node
only and by allowing each user to generate as many public-keys as required.
In this chapter we consider the topological structure of two networks derived
from Bitcoin’s public transaction history. We show that the two networks
have a non-trivial topological structure, provide complementary views of the
Bitcoin system and have implications for anonymity. We combine these struc-
tures with external information and techniques such as context discovery and
flow analysis to investigate an alleged theft of Bitcoins, which, at the time of
the theft, had a market value of approximately half a million U.S. dollars.
Key words: Network Analysis, Anonymity, Bitcoin
1.1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic currency system first described in a paper
by Satoshi Nakamoto (a pseudonym) in 2008 [20]. It relies on digital sig-
natures to prove ownership and a public history of transactions to prevent
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double-spending. The history of transactions is shared using a peer-to-peer
network and is agreed upon using a proof-of-work system [13, 5].
The first Bitcoins were transacted in January 2009 and by June 2011 there
were 6.5 million Bitcoins in circulation among an estimated 10,000 users [28].
In recent months, the currency has seen rapid growth in both media atten-
tion and market price relative to existing currencies. At its peak, a single
Bitcoin traded for more than US$30 on popular Bitcoin exchanges. At the
same time, U.S. Senators and lobby groups in Germany, such as Der Bun-
desverband Digitale Wirtschaft (BVWD) or the Federal Association of Digital
Economy, have raised concerns regarding the untraceability of Bitcoins and
their potential to harm society through tax evasion, money laundering and
illegal transactions. The implications of the decentralized nature of Bitcoin
for authorities’ ability to regulate and monitor the flow of currency is as yet
unclear.
Many users adopt Bitcoin for political and philosophical reasons, as much
as pragmatic ones. There is an understanding amongst Bitcoin’s more tech-
nical users that anonymity is not a promenient design goal of the system;
however, opinions vary widely as to how anonymous the system is, in prac-
tice. Jeff Garzik, a member of Bitcoin’s development team, is quoted as saying
it would be unwise “to attempt major illicit transactions with Bitcoin, given
existing statistical analysis techniques deployed in the field by law enforce-
ment”1; however, prior to this work, no analysis of anonymity in Bitcoin was
publicly available to substantiate or refute these claims. Furthermore, many
other users of the system do not share this belief. For example, WikiLeaks,
an international organization for anonymous whistleblowers, recently advised
its Twitter followers that it now accepts anonymous donations via Bitcoin
(see Fig. 1.1) and states that2:
“Bitcoin is a secure and anonymous digital currency. Bitcoins cannot be easily
tracked back to you, and are a [sic] safer and faster alternative to other donation
methods.”
They proceed to describe a more secure method of donating Bitcoins that
involves the generation of a one-time public-key but the implications for those
who donate using the tweeted public-key are unclear. Is it possible to associate
a donation with other Bitcoin transactions performed by the same user or
perhaps identify them using external information? The extent to which this
anonymity holds in the face of determined analysis remains to be tested.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 1.2 we consider some ex-
isting work relating to electronic currencies and anonymity. The economic
aspects of the system, interesting in their own right, are beyond the scope
of this work. In Sect. 1.3 we present an overview of the Bitcoin system;
we focus on three features that are particularly relevant to our analysis. In
1 http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/06/libertarian-dream-a-site-
where-you-buy-drugs-with-digital-dollars/239776 – Retrieved 2011-11-12
2 http://wikileaks.org/support.html – Retrieved: 2011-07-22
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Fig. 1.1: Screen capture of a tweet from WikiLeaks announcing their acceptance of ‘anony-
mous Bitcoin donations’.
Sect. 1.4 we construct two network structures, the transaction network and
the user network using the publicly available transaction history. We study
the static and dynamic properties of these networks. In Sect. 1.5 we consider
the implications of these network structures for anonymity. We also combine
information external to the Bitcoin system with techniques such as flow and
temporal analysis to illustrate how various types of information leakage can
contribute to the de-anonymization of the system’s users. Finally, we conclude
in Sect. 1.6.
1.1.1 A Note Regarding Motivation and Disclosure
Our motivation for this analysis is not to de-anonymize individual users of
the Bitcoin system. Rather, it is to demonstrate, using a passive analysis
of a publicly available dataset, the inherent limits of anonymity when using
Bitcoin. This will ensure that users do not have expectations that are not
being fulfilled by the system.
In security-related research, there is considerable tension over how best
to disclose vulnerabilities [9]. Many researchers favor full disclosure where
all information regarding a vulnerability is promptly released. This enables
informed users to promptly take defensive measures. Other researchers fa-
vor limited disclosure; while this provides attackers with a window in which
to exploit uninformed users, a mitigation strategy can be prepared and im-
plemented before public announcement, thus limiting damage, e.g. through a
software update. Our analysis illustrates some potential risks and pitfalls with
regard to anonymity in the Bitcoin system. However, there is no central au-
thority which can fundamentally change the system’s behavior. Furthermore,
it is not possible to mitigate analysis of the existing transaction history.
There are also two noteworthy features of the dataset when compared with,
say, contentious social network datasets, e.g. the Facebook profiles of Harvard
University students [19]. Firstly, the delineation between what is considered
public and private is clear: the entire history of Bitcoin transactions is publicly
available. Secondly, the Bitcoin system does not have a usage policy. After
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joining Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network, a client can freely request the entire
history of Bitcoin transactions; there is no crawling or scraping required.
Thus, we believe the best strategy to minimise the threat to user anonymity
is to be descriptive about the risks of the Bitcoin system. We do not identify
individual users – apart from those in the case study – but we note that it
is not difficult for other groups to replicate our work. Indeed, given the pas-
sive nature of the analysis, other parties may already be conducting similar
analyses.
1.2 Related Work
The related work for this chapter can be categorized into two fields: electronic
currencies and anonymity.
1.2.1 Electronic Currencies
Electronic currencies can be technically classified according to their mech-
anisms for establishing ownership, protecting against double-spending, en-
suring anonymity and/or privacy, and generating and issuing new currency.
Bitcoin is particularly noteworthy for the last of these mechanisms. The
proof-of-work system [13, 5] that establishes consensus regarding the his-
tory of transactions also doubles as a minting mechanism. The scheme was
first outlined in the B-Money Proposal [12]. We briefly consider some alterna-
tive mechanisms. Ripple [14] is an electronic currency where every user can
issue currency. However, the currency is only accepted by peers who trust
the issuer. Transactions between arbitrary pairs of users require chains of
trusted intermediaries between the users. Saito [25] formalized and imple-
mented a similar system, i-WAT, in which the the chain of intermediaries
can be established without their immediate presence using digital signatures.
KARMA [29] is an electronic currency where the central authority is dis-
tributed over a set of users that are involved in all transactions. PPay [30] is
a micropayment scheme for peer-to-peer systems where the issuer of the cur-
rency is responsible for keeping track of it. However, both KARMA and PPay
may incur a large overhead when the rate of transactions is high. Mondex
is a smart-card electronic currency [27]. It preserves a central bank’s role in
the generation and issuance of electronic currency. Mondex was an electronic
replacement for cash in the physical world whereas Bitcoin is an electronic
analog of cash in the online world.
The authors are not aware of any studies of the network structure of elec-
tronic currencies. However, there are such studies of physical currencies. The
community currency Tomamae-cho was introduced into the Hokkaido Prefec-
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ture in Japan for a three-month period during 2004–05 in a bid to revitalize
local economy. The Tomamae-cho system involved gift-certificates that were
re-usable and legally redeemable into yen. There was an entry space on the
reverse of each certificate for recipients to record transaction dates, their
names and addresses, and the purposes of use, up to a maximum of five re-
cipients. Kichiji and Nishibe [17] used the collected certificates to derive a
network structure that represented the flow of currency during the period.
They showed that the cumulative degree distribution of the network obeyed
a power-law distribution, the network had small-world properties (the aver-
age clustering coefficient was high whereas the average path length was low),
the directionality and the value of transactions were significant features, and
the double-triangle system [23] was effective. There also exist studies of the
physical movement of currency: ‘Where’s George?’ [1] is a crowd-sourced
method for tracking U.S. dollar bills where users record the serial numbers of
bills in their possession, along with their current location. If a bill is recorded
sufficiently often, its geographical movement can be tracked over time. Brock-
mann et al. [8] used this dataset as a proxy for studying multi-scale human
mobility and as a tool for computing geographic borders inherent to human
mobility.
Grinberg [2] considers some of the legal issues that may be relevant to
Bitcoin in the United States. For example, does Bitcoin violate the Stamp
Payments Act of 1862? The currency can be used as a token for “a less sum
than $1, intended to circulate as money or to be received or used in lieu of
lawful money of the United States”. However, the authors of the act could not
have conceived of digital currencies at the time of its writing and therefore
Bitcoin may not fall under its scope. Grinberg believes that Bitcoin is unlikely
to be a security or more specifically an “investment contract” and therefore
does not fall under the Securities Act of 1933. He also believes that the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970 and the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 pose
the greatest risk for Bitcoin developers, exchanges, wallet providers, mining
pool operators and businesses that accept Bitcoins. These acts require certain
kinds of financial businesses, even if they are located abroad, to register with
a bureau of the United States Department of the Treasury known as the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (or FinCEN). The legality of Bitcoin
is outside the scope of our work but is interesting nonetheless.
1.2.2 Anonymity
Previous work has shown the difficulty in maintaining anonymity in the con-
text of networked data and online services which expose partial user informa-
tion. Narayanan and Shmatikov [22] and Backstrom et al. [6] consider privacy
attacks which identify users using the structure of networks and show the dif-
ficulty in guaranteeing anonymity in the presence of network data. Crandall
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et al. [11] infer social ties between users where none are explicitly stated by
looking at patterns of ‘co-incidences’ or common off-network co-occurrences.
Gross and Acquisiti [15] discuss privacy of early users in the Facebook so-
cial network, and how information from multiple sources could be combined
to identify pseudonymous network users. Narayanan and Shmatikov [21] de-
anonymized the Netflix Prize dataset using information from IMDB3 which
had similar user content, showing that statistical matching between different
but related datasets can be used to attack anonymity. Puzis et al. [24] simu-
lated the monitoring of a communications network using strategically-located
monitoring nodes and showed that, using real-world network topologies, a rel-
atively small number of nodes can collaborate to pose a significant threat to
anonymity. Korolova et al. [18] study strategies for efficiently compromising
network nodes, to maximise link information observed. Altshuler et al. [3] dis-
cuss the increasing dangers of attacks targeting similar types of information,
and provide measures of the difficulty of such attacks, on particular networks.
All of this work points to the difficulty in maintaining anonymity where net-
work data on user behaviour is available and illustrates how seemingly minor
information leakages can be aggregated to pose significant risks. The security
researcher Dan Kaminsky independently performed an investigation of some
aspects of anonymity in the Bitcoin system, which he presented at a security
conference [16] shortly after an initial draft of this work was made public. His
work investigates the ‘linking problem’ we analyze in Sect. 1.4.2. In addition
to the analysis we conducted, his work investigates the Bitcoin system from
an angle we did not consider in our investigation – the TCP/IP operation
of the underlying peer-to-peer network. Kaminsky’s TCP/IP layer findings
strengthen the core claims of this work that Bitcoin does not anonymise user
activity. We provide a summary of his findings in Sect. 1.5.2.
1.3 The Bitcoin System
The following is a simplified description of the Bitcoin system; see Nakamoto
[20] for a more thorough treatment. Bitcoin is an electronic currency with
no central authority or issuer. There is no central bank or fractional reserve
system controlling the supply of Bitcoins. Instead, they are generated at a
predictable rate such that the eventual total number will be 21 million. There
is no requirement for a trusted third-party when making transactions. Sup-
pose Alice wishes to ‘send’ a number of Bitcoins to Bob. Alice uses a Bitcoin
client to join the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network and makes a public trans-
action or declaration stating that one or more identities that she controls
(which can be verified using public-key cryptography), and which previously
had a number of Bitcoins assigned to them, wish to re-assign those Bitcoins
3 http://www.imdb.com
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to one or more other identities, at least one of which is controlled by Bob. The
participants of the peer-to-peer network form a collective consensus regard-
ing the validity of this transaction by appending it to the public history of
previously agreed-upon transactions (the block-chain). This process involves
the repeated computation of a cryptographic hash function so that the digest
of the transaction, along with other pending transactions, and an arbitrary
nonce, has a specific form. This process is designed to require considerable
computational effort, from which the security of the Bitcoin mechanism is
derived. To encourage users to pay this computational cost, the process is
incentivized using newly generated Bitcoins and/or transaction fees, and so
this whole process is known as mining.
In this chapter, there are three features of the Bitcoin system that are
of particular interest. Firstly, the entire history of Bitcoin transactions is
publicly available. This is necessary in order to validate transactions and
prevent double-spending in the absence of a central authority. The only way
to confirm the absence of a previous transaction is to be aware of all previous
transactions. The second feature of interest is that a transaction can have
multiple inputs and multiple outputs. An input to a transaction is either the
output of a previous transaction or a sum of newly generated Bitcoins and
transaction fees. A transaction frequently has either a single input from a
previous larger transaction or multiple inputs from previous smaller transac-
tions. Also, a transaction frequently has two outputs: one sending payment
and one returning change. Thirdly, the payer and payee(s) of a transaction
are identified through public-keys from public-private key-pairs. However, a
user can have multiple public-keys. In fact, it is considered good practice for
a payee to generate a new public-private key-pair for every transaction. Fur-
thermore, a user can take the following steps to better protect their identity:
they can avoid revealing any identifying information in connection with their
public-keys; they can repeatedly send varying fractions of their Bitcoins to
themselves using multiple (newly generated) public-keys; and/or they can
use a trusted third-party mixer or laundry. However, these practices are not
universally applied.
The three features above, namely the public availability of Bitcoin trans-
actions, the input-output relationship between transactions and the re-use
and co-use of public-keys, provide a basis for two distinct network structures:
the transaction network and the user network. The transaction network rep-
resents the flow of Bitcoins between transactions over time. Each vertex rep-
resents a transaction and each directed edge between a source and a target
represents an output of the transaction corresponding to the source that is
an input to the transaction corresponding to the target. Each directed edge
also includes a value in Bitcoins and a timestamp. The user network repre-
sents the flow of Bitcoins between users over time. Each vertex represents
a user and each directed edge between a source and a target represents an
input-output pair of a single transaction where the input’s public-key belongs
to the user corresponding to the source and the output’s public-key belongs
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to the user corresponding to the target. Each directed edge also includes a
value in Bitcoins and a timestamp.
We gathered the entire history of Bitcoin transactions from the first trans-
action on the 3rd January 2009 up to and including the last transaction
that occurred on the 12th July 2011. We gathered the dataset using the
Bitcoin client4 and a modified version of Gavin Andresen’s bitcointools
project.5 The dataset comprises 1 019 486 transactions between 1 253 054
unique public-keys. We describe the construction of the corresponding trans-
action and user networks and their analyses in the following sections. We
will show that the two networks are complex, have a non-trivial topologi-
cal structure, provide complementary views of the Bitcoin system and have
implications for the anonymity of users.
1.4 The Transaction and User Networks
1.4.1 The Transaction Network
The transaction network T represents the flow of Bitcoins between trans-
actions over time. Each vertex represents a transaction and each directed
edge between a source and a target represents an output of the transaction
corresponding to the source that is an input to the transaction correspond-
ing to the target. Each directed edge also includes a value in Bitcoins and a
timestamp. It is a straight-forward task to construct T from our dataset.
1.2 BTC
01/05/2011 14:13:26
... t4 has 12 other  
inputs not shown here
1.32 BTC
14:10:54 05/05/2011
0.12 BTC
13:12:19 05/05/2011
t1
t2
t3 t4
Fig. 1.2: An example sub-network from the transaction network. Each rectangular vertex
represents a transaction and each directed edge represents a flow of Bitcoins from an output
of one transaction to an input of another.
4 http://www.bitcoin.org
5 http://github.com/gavinandresen/bitcointools
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Figure 1.2 shows an example sub-network of T . t1 is a transaction with
one input and two outputs.6 It was added to the block-chain on the 1st May
2011. One of its outputs assigned 1.2 BTC (Bitcoins) to a user identified by
the public-key pk1.
7 The public-keys are not shown in Fig. 1.2. Similarly, t2
is a transaction with two inputs and two outputs.8 It was accepted on the 5th
May 2011. One of its outputs sent 0.12 BTC to a user identified by a different
public-key, pk2.
9 t3 is a transaction with two inputs and one output.
10 It was
accepted on the 5th May 2011. Both of its inputs are connected to the two
aforementioned outputs of t1 and t2. The only output of t3 was redeemed by
t4.
11
T has 974 520 vertices and 1 558 854 directed edges. The number of vertices
is less than the total number of transactions in the dataset because we omit
transactions that are not connected to at least one other transaction. These
correspond to newly generated Bitcoins and transactions fees that are not
yet redeemed. The network has neither multi-edges (multiple edges between
the same pair of vertices in the same direction) nor loops. It is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) since the output of a transaction can never be an input
(either directly or indirectly) to the same transaction.
Figure 1.3(a) shows a log-log plot of the cumulative degree distributions:
the solid red curve is the cumulative degree distribution (in- and out-degree);
the dashed green curve is the cumulative in-degree distribution; and the dot-
ted blue curve is the cumulative out-degree distribution. We fitted power-law
distributions, p(x) ∼ x−α for x > xmin, to the three distributions by es-
timating the parameters α and xmin using a goodness-of-fit method [10].
Table 1.1 shows the estimates along with the corresponding Kolmogorov–
Smirnov goodness-of-fit (GoF) statistics and p-values. We observe that none
of the distributions for which the empirically-best scaling region is non-trivial
have a power-law as a plausible hypothesis (p > 0.1). This is likely due to
the fact that there is no preferential attachment [26, 7]: new vertices are
joined to existing vertices whose corresponding transactions are not yet fully
redeemed.
There are 1 949 (maximal weakly) connected components in the network.
Fig. 1.3(b) shows a log-log plot of the cumulative component size distribution.
There are 948 287 vertices (97.31%) in the giant component. This component
6 The transactions and public-keys used in our examples ex-
ist in our dataset. The unique identifier for the transaction t1 is
09441d3c52fa0018365fcd2949925182f6307322138773d52c201f5cc2bb5976. You can query
the details of a transaction or public-key by examining Bitcoin’s block-chain using, say,
the Bitcoin Block Explorer (http://www.blockexplorer.com).
7 13eBhR3oHFD5wkE4oGtrLdbdi2PvK3ijMC
8 0c4d41d0f5d2aff14d449daa550c7d9b0eaaf35d81ee5e6e77f8948b14d62378
9 19smBSUoRGmbH13vif1Nu17S63Tnmg7h9n
10 0c034fb964257ecbf4eb953e2362e165dea9c1d008032bc9ece5cebbc7cd4697
11 f16ece066f6e4cf92d9a72eb1359d8401602a23990990cb84498cdbb93026402
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Fig. 1.3: For the transaction network: (a) A log-log plot of the cumulative degree distri-
butions. (b) A log-log plot of the cumulative component size distribution. (c) A temporal
histogram showing the number of edges per month. (d) A temporal histogram showing the
density per month. (e) A temporal histogram showing the average path length per month.
also contains a giant biconnected component with 716 354 vertices (75.54%
of the vertices in the giant component).
Variable x˜ x¯ s α xmin GoF p-val.
Degree 3 3.20 6.20 3.24 50 0.02 0.05
In-Degree 1 1.60 5.31 2.50 4 0.01 0.00
Out-Degree 1 1.60 3.17 3.50 51 0.05 0.00
Table 1.1: The degree, in-degree and out-degree distributions of T .
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We also performed a rudimentary dynamic analysis of the network. Fig-
ures 1.3(c), 1.3(d) and 1.3(e) show the edge number, density and average path
length of the transaction network on a monthly basis. These measurements
are not cumulative. The network’s growth and sparsification are evident. We
also observe some anomalies in the average path length during July and
November 2010.
1.4.2 The User Network
The user network U represents the flow of Bitcoins between users over time.
Each vertex represents a user and each directed edge between a source and
a target represents an input-output pair of a single transaction where the
input’s public-key belongs to the user corresponding to the source and the
output’s public-key belongs to the user corresponding to the target. Each
directed edge also includes a value in Bitcoins and a timestamp.
We need to perform a preprocessing step before we can construct U from
our dataset. Suppose U is, at first, incomplete in the sense that each ver-
tex represents a single public-key rather than a user and that each directed
edge between a source and a target represents an input-output pair of a sin-
gle transaction, where the input’s public-key corresponds to the source and
the output’s public-key corresponds to the target. In order to perfect this
network, we need to contract each subset of vertices whose corresponding
public-keys belong to a single user. The difficulty is that public-keys are Bit-
coin’s mechanism for ensuring anonymity: ‘the public can see that someone
[identified by a public-key] is sending an amount to someone else [identified by
another public-key], but without information linking the transaction to any-
one.’ [20]. In fact, it is considered good practice for a payee to generate a new
public-private key-pair for every transaction to keep transactions from being
linked to a common owner. Therefore, it is impossible to completely perfect
the network using our dataset alone. However, as noted by Nakamoto [20],
“Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily
reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner
of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the
same owner.”
We will use this property of transactions with multiple inputs to contract
subsets of vertices in the incomplete network. We construct an ancillary net-
work in which each vertex represents a public-key. We connect pairs of vertices
with undirected edges, where each edge joins a pair of public keys that are
both inputs to the same transaction and are thus controlled by the same
user. From our dataset, this ancillary network has 1 253 054 vertices (unique
public-keys) and 4 929 950 edges. More importantly, it has 86 641 non-trivial
maximal connected components. Each maximal connected component in this
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graph corresponds to a user, and each component’s constituent vertices cor-
respond to that user’s public-keys.
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Fig. 1.4: For the user network: (a) A log-log plot of the cumulative degree distributions.
(b) A log-log plot of the cumulative component size distribution. (c) A temporal histogram
showing the number of edges per month. (d) A temporal histogram showing the density
per month. (e) A temporal histogram showing the average path length per month.
Figure 1.5 shows an example sub-network of the incomplete network over-
laid onto the example sub-network of T from Fig. 1.2. The outputs of t1 and
t2 that were eventually redeemed by t3 were sent to a user whose public-key
was pk1 and a user whose public-key was pk2 respectively. Figure 1.6 shows
an example sub-network of the user network overlaid onto the example sub-
network of the incomplete network from Fig. 1.5. pk1 and pk2 are contracted
into a single vertex u1 since they correspond to a pair inputs of a single trans-
action. In other words, they are in the same maximal connected component of
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t1
t2
t3 t4
pk2
pk1
Fig. 1.5: An example sub-network from the incomplete network. Each diamond vertex
represents a public-key and each directed edge between diamond vertices represents a flow
of Bitcoins from one public-key to another.
pk2
pk1
u1
u2
1.32 
BTC
14:10
:54
05/05
/2011
pk2pk1
Fig. 1.6: An example sub-network from the user network. Each circular vertex represents
a user and each directed edge between circular vertices represents a flow of Bitcoins from
one user to another. The maximal connected component from the ancillary network that
corresponds to the vertex u1 is shown within the dashed grey box.
the ancillary network (see the vertices representing pk1 and pk2 in the dashed
grey box in Fig. 1.6). A single user owns both public-keys. We note that the
maximal connected component in this case is not simply a clique; it has a
diameter of four indicating that there are at least two public-keys belonging
to that same user that are connected indirectly via three transactions. The
sixteen inputs to transaction t4 result in the contraction of a further sixteen
public-keys into a single vertex u2. The value and timestamp of the flow of
Bitcoins from u1 to u2 is derived from the transaction network.
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After the preprocessing step, U has 881 678 vertices (86 641 non-trivial
maximal connected components and 795 037 isolated vertices in the ancillary
network) and 1 961 636 directed edges. The network is still incomplete. We
have not contracted all possible vertices but it will suffice for our present
analysis. Unlike T , U has multi-edges, loops and directed cycles.
Figure 1.4(a) shows a log-log plot of the network’s cumulative degree dis-
tributions. We fitted power-law distributions to the three distributions and
calculated their goodness-of-fit and statistical significance as in the previous
section. Table 1.2 shows the results. We observe that none of the distributions
have a power-law as a plausible hypothesis.
There are 604 (maximal) weakly connected components and 579 355 (max-
imal) strongly connected components in the network; Fig. 1.4(b) shows a log-
log plot of the cumulative component size distribution for both variations.
There are 879 859 vertices (99.79%) in the giant weakly connected compo-
nent. This component also contains a giant weakly biconnected component
with 652 892 vertices (74.20% of the vertices in the giant component).
Variable x˜ x¯ s α xmin GoF p-val.
Degree 3 4.45 218.10 2.38 66 0.02 0.00
In-Degree 1 2.22 86.40 2.45 57 0.05 0.00
Out-Degree 2 2.22 183.91 2.03 10 0.22 0.00
Table 1.2: The degree, in-degree and out-degree distributions of U .
Our dynamic analysis of the user network mirrors that of the transaction
network in the previous subsection. Figures 1.4(c), 1.4(d) and 1.4(e) show
the edge number, density and average path length of the user network on
a monthly basis. These measurements are not cumulative. The network’s
growth and sparsification are evident. We note that even though our dynamic
analysis of the user network is on a monthly basis, the preprocessing step is
performed using the ancillary network of the entire incomplete network. This
enables us to resolve public-keys to a single user irrespective of the month in
which the linking transactions occur.
The contraction of public-keys into users, while incomplete, generates a
network that is in many ways a proxy for the social network of Bitcoin users.
The edges represent financial transactions between pairs of users. It may be
possible to identify, for example, communities, central users and hoarders
within this social network.
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1.5 Anonymity Analysis
Prior to performing the analyses above, we expected the user network to be
largely composed of trees representing Bitcoin flows between one-time public-
keys that were not linked with other public-keys. However, our analyses reveal
that the user network has considerable cyclic structure. We now consider
the implications of this structure, coupled with other aspects of the Bitcoin
system, for anonymity.
There are several ways in which the user network can be used to deduce
information about Bitcoin users. We can use global network properties, such
as degree distribution, to identify outliers. We can use local network proper-
ties to examine the context in which a user operates by observing the users
with which he or she interacts with either directly or indirectly. The dynamic
nature of the user network also enables us to perform flow and temporal anal-
yses. We can examine the significant Bitcoin flows between groups of users
over time. We will now discuss each of these possibilities in more detail and
provide a case study to demonstrate their use in practice.
1.5.1 Integrating Off-Network Information
There is no user directory for the Bitcoin system. However, we can attempt
to build a partial user directory associating Bitcoin users (and their known
public-keys) with off-network information. If we can make sufficient associ-
ations and combine them with the network structures above, a potentially
serious threat to anonymity emerges.
Many organizations and services such as on-line stores that accept Bit-
coins, exchanges, laundry services and mixers have access to identifying in-
formation regarding their users, e.g. e-mail addresses, shipping addresses,
credit card and bank account details, IP addresses, etc. If any of this infor-
mation is publicly available, or accessible by, say, law enforcement agencies,
then the identities of users involved in related transactions may also be at
risk. To illustrate this point, we consider a number of publicly available data
sources and integrate their information with the user network.
1.5.1.1 The Bitcoin Faucet
The Bitcoin Faucet12 is a website where users can donate Bitcoins to be
redistributed in small amounts to other users. In order to prevent abuse of
this service, a history of recent give-aways are published along with the IP
addresses of the recipients. When the Bitcoin Faucet does not batch the re-
12 http://freebitcoins.appspot.com
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distribution, it is possible to associate the IP addresses with the recipient’s
public-keys. This page can be scraped over time to produce a time-stamped
mapping of IP addresses to users.
We found that the public-keys associated with many of the IP addresses
that received Bitcoins were contracted with other public-keys in the ancillary
network, thus revealing IP addresses that are somehow related to previous
transactions. Fig. 1.7(a) shows a map of geolocated IP addresses belonging to
users who received Bitcoins over a period of one week. Fig. 1.7(b) overlays the
user network onto a sample of those users. An edge between two geolocated IP
addresses indicates that the corresponding users are linked by an undirected
path of length at most three in the user network; the path must not contain
the vertex representing the Bitcoin Faucet itself.
These figures serve as a proof-of-concept from a small publicly available
data source. We note that large centralized Bitcoin service providers are
capable of producing much more detailed maps.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1.7: We can use the Bitcoin Faucet to map users to geolocated IP addresses. (a) A
map of geolocated IP addresses associated with users receiving Bitcoins from the Bitcoin
Faucet during a one week period. (b) A map of a sample of the geolocated IP addresses in
(a) connected by edges where the corresponding users are connected by a path of length at
most three in the user network that does not include the vertex representing the Bitcoin
Faucet.
1.5.1.2 Voluntary Disclosures
Another source of identifying information is the voluntary disclosure of
public-keys by users, for example, when posting to the Bitcoin forums13.
Bitcoin public-keys are typically represented as strings approximately thirty-
three characters in length and starting with the digit one. They are indexed
very well by popular search engines. We identified many high-degree vertices
with external information using a search engine alone. We scraped the Bit-
coin Forums where users frequently attach a public-key to their signatures.
13 http://forum.bitcoin.org
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We also gathered public-keys from Twitter streams and user-generated public
directories. It is important to note that in many cases we are able to resolve
the ‘public’ public-keys with other public-keys belonging to the same user us-
ing the ancillary network. We also note that large centralized Bitcoin service
providers can do the same with their user information.
1.5.2 TCP/IP Layer Information
Security researcher Dan Kaminsky has performed an analysis of the Bitcoin
system, investigating identity leakage at the TCP/IP layer. He found that by
opening a connection to all public peers in the network at once, he could map
IP addresses to Bitcoin public-keys, working from the assumption that “the
first node to inform you of a transaction is the source of it. . . [this is] more or
less true, and absolutely over time” [16]. Using this approach it is possible to
map public-keys to IP addresses unless users are using an anonymising proxy
technology such as TOR.
1.5.3 Egocentric Analysis and Visualization
There are severals pieces of information we can directly derive from the user
network regarding a particular user. We can compute the balance held by
a single public-key. We can also aggregate the balances belonging to public-
keys that are controlled by a particular user. For example, Fig. 1.8(a) and
Fig. 1.8(b) show the receipts and payments to and from WikiLeaks’ public-
key in terms of Bitcoins and the number of transactions respectively. The
donations are relatively small and are forwarded to other public-keys period-
ically. There was also a noticeable spike in donations when the facility was
first announced. Figure 1.8(c) shows the receipts and payments to and from
the creator of a popular Bitcoin trading website aggregated over a number
of public-keys that are linked through the ancillary network.
An important advantage of deriving network structures from the Bitcoin
transaction history is our ability to use network visualization and analysis
tools to investigate the flow of Bitcoins. For example, Fig. 1.9 shows the net-
work structure surrounding the WikiLeaks’ public-key in the incomplete user
network. Our tools resolve several of the vertices with identifying information
gathered in Sect. 1.5.1. These users can be linked either directly or indirectly
to their donations.
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Fig. 1.8: We can plot cumulative receipts and payments to and from Bitcoin public-keys
and users.
1.5.4 Context Discovery
Given a number of public-keys or users of interest, we can use network struc-
ture and context to better understand the flow of Bitcoins between them.
For example, we can examine all shortest paths between a set of vertices or
consider the maximum number of Bitcoins that can flow from a source to
a destination given the transactions and their ‘capacities’ in an interesting
time-window. For example, Fig. 1.10 shows all shortest paths between the
vertices representing the users we identified using off-network information in
Sect. 1.5.1 and the vertex that represents the MyBitcoin service14 in the user
network. We can identify more than 60% of the users in this visualization
and deduce many direct and indirect relationships between them.
14 http://www.mybitcoin.com
1.5 Anonymity Analysis 19
864768
9264
4096
6658
472235
80470
68102
18
411137
780297
140810
384012
587522
4623
23
751773
611795
192529
3726
334520
828650
146229
503227
18237
372
2434
928
187
880147
24634
233606
24215
301221
5821
5329
339
5992
751500
11767
508
359310
628760
684569
39855
466972
509470
693791
356385
297506
154569
267814
189486
70191
832671
459403
86175
290020
376702
283026
447905
737204
344528
921429
57908
436
145418
514111
58434
8259
12356
710582
704070
656967
146510
704591
863825
464995
52821
369238
527959
16987
343644
529502
615521
12387
13412
33893
644200
54890
710253
399470
395889
18036
688245
222134
164472
520832
132738
37825
17032
18576
826297
13458
244372
438264
529050
7708
578218
117419
438956
64686
175
18610
81093
1239
398555
216369
655670
50491
45400
32117
209391
491077
10675
406546
35359
40117
19638
18377
745503
140481
873847
494200
234195
761560
765657
8410
157403
623946
60643
889553
860392
500971
15598
643312
503026
1779
136948
564989
284930
1795
645446
184582
182487
852749
386325
594199
272431
167130
402500
253733
526638
720687
317235
518708
34621
341813
353253
675003
102022
45905
359250
305493
226134
84823
638885
364379
5982
914405
171360
15718
681322
77287
622956
447856
235752
463223
448376
28025
152443
8687
214400
18821
797574
803208
59275
503694
782736
631191
43076
237981
864158
124322
534086
502183
431016
74665
14764
522159
829366
750009
660923
304061
88480
402887
215502
35281
385440
50644
364811
400863
8673
36325
56401
373736
713708
82770
890863
101679
141395
106374
614392
55802
822782
Fig. 1.9: An egocentric visualization of the vertex representing WikiLeaks’ public-key in
the incomplete user network. The size of a vertex corresponds to its degree in the entire
incomplete user network. The color denotes the volume of Bitcoins – warmer colors have
larger volumes flowing through them. The three largest red vertices represent a Bitcoin
mining pool, a centralized Bitcoin wallet service, and an unknown entity.
Case Study – Part I: We analyse an alleged theft of 25 000 BTC reported
in the Bitcoin Forums15 by a user known as allinvain. The victim reported
that a large portion of his Bitcoins were sent to pkred
16 on 13/06/2011 at
16:52:23 UTC. The theft occurred shortly after somebody broke into the
victim’s Slush pool account17 and changed the payout address to pkblue.
18.
The Bitcoins rightfully belonged to pkgreen.
19 At the time of theft, the stolen
Bitcoins had a market value of approximately half a million U.S. dollars. We
chose this case study to illustrate the potential risks to the anonymity of a
user (the thief) who has good reason to remain anonymous.
We consider the incomplete user network before any contractions. We re-
strict ourselves to the egocentric network surrounding the thief: we include
every vertex that is reachable by a path of length at most two ignoring direc-
tionality and all edges induced by these vertices. We also remove all loops,
multiple edges and edges that are not contained in some biconnected com-
ponent to avoid clutter. In Fig. 1.11, the red vertex represents the thief who
15 http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=16457.0
16 1KPTdMb6p7H3YCwsyFqrEmKGmsHqe1Q3jg
17 http://mining.bitcoin.cz
18 15iUDqk6nLmav3B1xUHPQivDpfMruVsu9f
19 1J18yk7D353z3gRVcdbS7PV5Q8h5w6oWWG
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Fig. 1.10: A visualisation of all users identified in Sect. 1.5.1 and all shortest paths between
the vertices representing those users and the vertex representing the MyBitcoin service in
the user network.
Fig. 1.11: An egocentric visualization of the thief in the incomplete user network. For this
visualization, vertices are colored according to the text, edges are colored according to the
color of their sources and the size of each vertex is proportional to its edge-betweenness
within the egocentric network.
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owns the public-key pkred and the green vertex represents the victim who
owns the public-key pkgreen. The theft is represented by a green edge joining
the victim to the thief.
1 BTC
17:34:04 13/06/2011
25000 BTC
17:52:23 13/06/2011
0.31337 BTC
17:45:31 13/06/2011
0.120607 BTC
16:55:19 12/06/2011
0.11 BTC
04:04:14 22/05/2011
0.09 BTC
09:07:59 23/05/2011
60 transactions involving 441.83 
BTC over a 70-day period 
Thief
Victim
Time
Bi
tc
oi
ns
Fig. 1.12: An interesting sub-network induced by the thief, the victim and three other
vertices. The notation is the same as in Fig. 1.11.
Interestingly, the victim and the thief are joined by paths (ignoring di-
rectionality) other than the green edge representing the theft. For example,
consider the sub-network shown in Fig. 1.12 induced by the red, green, pur-
ple, yellow and orange vertices. This sub-network is a cycle. We contract all
vertices whose corresponding public-keys belong to the same user. This al-
lows us to attach values in Bitcoins and timestamps to the directed edges. We
can make a number of observations. Firstly, we note that the theft of 25 000
BTC was preceded by a smaller theft of 1 BTC. This was later reported by
the victim in the Bitcoin forums. Secondly, using off-network data, we have
identified some of the other colored vertices: the purple vertex represents
the main Slush pool account and the orange vertex represents the computer
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hacker group known as LulzSec.20 We note that there has been at least one
attempt to associate the thief with LulzSec21. This was a fake; it was created
after the theft. However, the identification of the orange vertex with LulzSec
is genuine and was established before the theft. We observe that the thief
sent 0.31337 BTC to LulzSec shortly after the theft but we cannot otherwise
associate him with the group. The main Slush pool account sent a total of
441.83 BTC to the victim over a 70-day period. It also sent a total of 0.2
BTC to the yellow vertex over a two day period. One day before the theft,
the yellow vertex also sent 0.120607 BTC to LulzSec.
The yellow vertex represents a user who is the owner of at least five public-
keys.22 Like the victim, he is a member of the Slush pool, and like the thief,
he is a one-time donator to LulzSec. This donation, the day before the theft,
is his last known activity using these public-keys.
1.5.5 Flow and Temporal Analyses
In addition to visualizing egocentric networks with a fixed radius, we can
follow significant flows of value through the network over time. If a vertex
representing a user receives a large volume of Bitcoins relative to their esti-
mated balance, and, shortly after, transfers a significant proportion of those
Bitcoins to another user, we deem this interesting. We built a special purpose
tool that, starting with a chosen vertex or set of vertices, traces significant
flows of Bitcoins over time. In practice we have found this tool to be quite
revealing when analyzing the user network.
Case Study – Part II: To demonstrate this tool we re-consider the Bitcoin
theft described earlier. We note that the victim has developed their own
tool to generate an exhaustive list of public-keys that have received some
portion of the stolen Bitcoins since the theft.23 However, this list grows very
quickly and, at the time of writing, contained more than 34 100 public-keys.
Figure 1.13 shows an annotated visualization produced using our tool. We
observe several interesting flows in the aftermath of the theft. The initial
theft of a small volume of 1 BTC is immediately followed by the theft of
25 000 BTC. This is represented as a dotted black line between the relevant
vertices, magnified in the left inset.
20 http://twitter.com/LulzSec/status/76388576832651265
21 http://pastebin.com/88nGp508
22 1MUpbAY7rjWxvLtUwLkARViqSdzypMgVW4
13tst9ukW294Q7f6zRJr3VmLq6zp1C68EK
1DcQvXMD87MaYcFZqHzDZyH3sAv8R5hMZe
1AEW9ToWWwKoLFYSsLkPqDyHeS2feDVsVZ
1EWASKF9DLUCgEFqfgrNaHzp3q4oEgjTsF
23 http://folk.uio.no/vegardno/allinvain-addresses.txt
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Fig. 1.13: Visualisation of Bitcoin flow from the alleged theft. The left inset shows the
initial shuffling of Bitcoins among accounts close to that of the alleged thief. The right
inset shows the flow of Bitcoins during several subsequent days. The flows split and ater
merge, validating that the flows found by the tool are probably still controlled by a single
user.
In the left inset, we can see that the Bitcoins are shuffled between a small
number of accounts and then transferred back to the initial account. After
this shuffling step, we have identified four significant outflows of Bitcoins that
began at 19:49, 20:01, 20:13 and 20:55. Of particular interest are the outflows
that began at 20:55 (labeled as ‘1’ in both insets) and 20:13 (labeled as ‘2’ in
both insets). These outflows pass through several subsequent accounts over
a period of several hours. Flow 1 splits at the vertex labeled A in the right
inset at 04:05 on the day after the theft. Some of its Bitcoins rejoin Flow 2
at the vertex labeled B. This new combined flow is labeled as ‘3’ in the right
inset. The remaining Bitcoins from Flow 1 pass through several additional
vertices in the next two days. This flow is labeled as ‘4’ in the right inset.
A surprising event occurs on 16/06/2011 at approximately 13:37. A small
number of Bitcoins are transferred from Flow 3 to a heretofore unseen public-
key pk1.
24 Approximately seven minutes later, a small number of Bitcoins
are transferred from Flow 3 to another heretofore unseen public-key pk2.
25
Finally, there are two simultaneous transfers from Flow 4 to two more hereto-
fore unseen public-keys: pk3
26 and pk4.
27 We have determined that these four
public-keys, pk1, pk2, pk3 and pk4 – which receive Bitcoins from two sepa-
rate flows that split from each other two days previously – are all contracted
24 1FKFiCYJSFqxT3zkZntHjfU47SvAzauZXN
25 1FhYawPhWDvkZCJVBrDfQoo2qC3EuKtb94
26 1MJZZmmSrQZ9NzeQt3hYP76oFC5dWAf2nD
27 12dJo17jcR78Uk1Ak5wfgyXtciU62MzcEc
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to the same user in our ancillary network. This user is represented as C in
Fig. 1.13.
There are several other examples of interesting flow. The flow labeled as Y
involves the movement of Bitcoins through thirty unique public-keys in a very
short period of time. At each step, a small number of Bitcoins (typically 30
BTC which had a market value of approximately US$500 at the time of the
transactions) are siphoned off. The public-keys that receive the small number
of Bitcoins are typically represented by small blue vertices due to their low
volume and degree. On 20/06/2011 at 12:35, each of these public-keys makes
a transfer to a public-key operated by the MyBitcoin service.28 Curiously,
this public-key was previously involved in another separate Bitcoin theft29.
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Fig. 1.14: The Bitcoins are transferred between public-keys along the highlighted paths
very quickly.
We also observe that the Bitcoins in many of the above flows are trans-
ferred between public-keys very quickly. Fig. 1.14 shows two flows in partic-
ular where the intermediate parties waited for very few confirmations before
re-sending the Bitcoins to other public-keys.
Much of this analysis is circumstantial. We cannot say for certain whether
or not these flows imply a shared agency in both incidents. However, it does
illustrate the power of our tool when tracing the flow of Bitcoins and gener-
ating hypotheses. It also suggests that a centralized service may have further
details on the user(s) in control of the implicated public-keys.
28 1MAazCWMydsQB5ynYXqSGQDjNQMN3HFmEu
29 http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=20427.0
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1.5.6 Other Forms of Analysis
There are many other forms of analysis that can be applied in order to de-
anonymize the workings of the Bitcoin system:
• Many transactions have two outputs: one is the payment from a payer to
a payee and the other is the return of change to the payer. If we assume
that a transaction was created using a particular client implementation
and we have access to the client’s source code, then we may be able to
deduce, in some cases, which was the output and which was the change.
We can then map the public-key that the change was assigned to back to
the user who created the transaction.
• Order books for Bitcoin exchanges are typically available to support trad-
ing tools. As orders are often placed in Bitcoin values converted from
other currencies, they have a precise decimal value with eight significant
digits. It may be possible to find transactions with corresponding amounts
and thus map public-keys and transactions to the exchanges.
• Over an extended time period, several public-keys, if used at similar
times, may belong to the same user. It may be possible to construct
and cluster a co-occurrence network to help deduce mappings between
public-keys and users.
• Finally, there are far more sophisticated forms of attack where the at-
tacker actively participates in the network, for example, using marked
Bitcoins or by operating a laundry service.
1.5.7 Mitigation Strategies
In addition to educating users about the limits of anonymity in the Bit-
coin system, some risks to privacy could potentially be mitigated by making
changes to the system. A patch to the official Bitcoin client has been devel-
oped30 which allows users to prevent the linking of public-keys by making
the user aware of potential links within the Bitcoin client user-interface. It is
also possible for the client to automatically proxy Bitcoins through dummy
public-keys. This would come at the cost of increased transaction fees but
would increase deniability and obfuscate the chain of transaction histories.
Finally, if a future version of the protocol supported protocol-level mixing of
Bitcoins, this would increase the difficulty for a passive third-party to track
individual user histories.
30 http://coderrr.wordpress.com/2011/06/30/patching-the-bitcoin-client-to-make-it-
more-anonymous – Retrieved 2011-11-04
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1.6 Conclusions
For the past half-century futurists have heralded the advent of a cash-less
society [4]. Many of their predictions have been realized, e.g. Anderson et
al.’s [4]’s ‘on-line real-time’ payment system and bank-maintained ‘central
information files’. However, cash is still a competitive and relatively anony-
mous means of payment. Bitcoin is an electronic analog of cash in the online
world. It is decentralized: there is no central authority responsible for the
issuance of Bitcoins and there is no need to involve a trusted third-party
when making online transfers. However, this flexibility comes at a price: the
entire history of Bitcoin transactions is publicly available. In this chapter we
investigated the structure of two networks derived from this dataset and their
implications for user anonymity.
Using an appropriate network representation, it is possible to associate
many public-keys with each other, and with external identifying information.
With appropriate tools, the activity of known users can be observed in detail.
This can be performed using a passive analysis only. Active analyses, where
an interested party can potentially deploy ‘marked’ Bitcoins and collaborate
with other users can discover even more information. We also believe that
large centralized services such as the exchanges and wallet services are capable
of identifying and tracking considerable portions of user activity.
Technical members of the Bitcoin community have cautioned that strong
anonymity is not a prominent design goal of the Bitcoin system. However,
casual users need to be aware of this, especially when sending Bitcoins to
users and organizations they would prefer not to be publicly associated with.
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